16 Sep 2026 News

Election 2026: Almost even, but not yet decided

The election is not yet decided, although the opposition currently appears likely to secure a majority. There is still considerable uncertainty about what the next government will look like, and Ulf Kristersson remains prime minister for the time being. Parliament will convene on September 28 to elect the Speaker, and the new parliamentary session will open on September 29. 

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Before votes cast abroad and late advance votes have been counted, the red-green opposition comprising S, V, C, and MP leads by 176 seats to 173. The margin represents just over 33,000 votes. All votes are expected to have been counted by Wednesday or Thursday. This could shift the result slightly, but experts do not expect the majority to change. Voter turnout is expected to reach approximately 83 percent, compared with the 21st-century record of 87.2 percent in the 2018 election.

(S = Social democrats, V = The Left party, C= Center party, MP = The Green party). (Tidö-agreement parties: M = Moderate Party, SD = Sweden democrats, KD = Christian democrats, L = Liberals).

Results

  1. The two blocs were almost evenly matched on election night, and the Social Democrats (S) currently appear to be heading for a historically weak result of 28.1 percent, down 2.3 percentage points. This would be the party’s worst election result since 1928, although it would still remain the largest party. If the Social Democrats are given the opportunity to form a government, however, they will regard the outcome as a success. The Moderates (M) receive 19.9 percent, up 0.8 percentage points, and overtake the Sweden Democrats as the second-largest party. This allows Kristersson to see himself, at least to some extent, as a winner as well. The Sweden Democrats (SD) record the largest decline of any party, falling from 20.5 percent to 17.5 percent. All the smaller parties have increased their support.
  2. Healthcare was the most important election issue. The issues voters considered most important were healthcare (53 percent), education (51 percent), and law and order (48 percent). The next government will need to address these priorities.
  3. The Social Democrats’ result is historically weak. Despite spending four years in opposition, the party has lost voters, particularly in Norrland and among younger voters. Its electoral strategy largely repeated the approach taken in the unsuccessful 2022 election, focusing on warning voters about SD rather than presenting its own policies. Magdalena Andersson’s future now depends on whether she can put together a viable governing alternative. If she fails, criticism of her leadership and the party’s flawed electoral strategy is likely to increase rapidly.
  4. First-time voters support the Moderates. The Moderates received the strongest support among first-time voters, while SD lost ground and the Social Democrats received only 20 percent of the vote within this group, compared with 36 percent among voters over the age of 65. The Left Party and the Green Party enjoy stronger support among first-time voters than among the electorate as a whole.

The margin is three seats and just over 33,000 votes. The final distribution of seats will not be confirmed until Wednesday or Thursday. 

Five paths to a new government

We share the assessment of most experts that a government comprising S, V, C, and MP is unlikely, as C refuses to accept V as part of the government. This leaves a number of other possible alternatives.

(S = Social democrats, V = The Left party, C= Center party, MP = The Green party). (Tidö-agreement parties: M = Moderate Party, SD = Sweden democrats, KD = Christian democrats, L = Liberals).

Scenario A: A red-green centrist government without V.

If the red-green victory holds, S, MP, and C would form the government, with V remaining outside it. V would agree not to vote against the government in exchange for commitments and concessions on specific policy issues. There are significant political differences between C and V, which would make this arrangement difficult. Keeping V outside the government could, however, create opportunities for cross-bloc agreements on certain issues.

Scenario B: The Tidö-Agreement parties remain in power, requiring a shift of at least two seats.

In the previous election, one seat shifted to the Tidö coalition between election night and the Wednesday count. Could two seats shift this time? If so, the Tidö coalition could remain in power, and the incumbent prime minister would have the first opportunity to form a government. This may not be quite as straightforward as it sounds, as the parties would need to negotiate a new political agreement that every member of the Tidö coalition could accept. SD ministers and ministerial portfolios would also be likely to generate debate.

Scenario C: A broad centrist government with 188 seats.

This government would comprise S, MP, C, KD, and L, with the basic aim of keeping both V and SD out of government. The option could become relevant after several rounds of talks led by the Speaker, if Sweden enters a political crisis and someone needs to take responsibility. The arrangement could be difficult for L because of the tactical support votes it received. Although KD made some overtures toward S during the election campaign, it is uncertain whether the party would be prepared to join an S-led government. C would welcome such a government, while S and MP would need to accept a more right-leaning policy agenda.

Scenario D: A Moderate-led Tidö government with C.

One possible arrangement would keep SD outside a Tidö government, while SD agreed not to vote against it in exchange for policy gains. C would agree to join the government as long as SD remained outside it. This would require C to soften its opposition to SD, while SD would once again need to accept remaining outside the government. Neither would be easy.

Scenario E: Deadlock – four rounds of talks led by the Speaker, followed by an extra election.

No agreement is reached, and Sweden holds an extraordinary election. This is a scenario most parties want to avoid. It could damage voters’ trust in politics, particularly if all the same deal-breakers were repeated in a new election. A likely Tidö victory in an extraordinary election would lead to strong criticism of, and within, the red-green parties for their failure to create a viable governing alternative. 

Miltton’s most important conclusion is that the final election result must be confirmed before the seat calculations can be completed and the possible governing alternatives analyzed in greater detail. Several solutions are possible, but none of them is simple. 

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