Who did Bulgaria really vote for?

After becoming an anecdotal example when it comes to elections, after eight attempts at a parliamentary vote since April 2021, on 19 April 2026 Bulgaria consolidated the expected winner with a decisive 30% lead over the second place. This mandate reflects an uncompromising demand for stable government and judicial reform, backed by a concrete-strong majority of 131 out of 240 seats. But is that really good news?

President Rumen Radev (2016 – 2026) was among the most visible political supporters of Bulgaria’s 2020 anti-corruption protests. A NATO general, he is reported to have been nominated for the presidency by the Bulgarian Socialist Party with the approval and insight of Leonid Reshetnikov, as he himself stated on Russian television. Radev spoke of dismantling ‘the model’ blaming ‘the mafia’ for Bulgaria’s ills, a platform that secured his second term in 2021.

Following the biggest protests since the early 1990s that took the government down in December 2025 with renewed demands for judicial reform and an end to corruption, Bulgaria headed to the polls without a functioning budget, an army still dependent on Soviet-era hardware rather than NATO-standard capabilities, and a captured judicial system to the point it has become synonymous for locals with the word ‘mafiotisation’.

Early this year Radev stepped down from the Presidency before the end of his second term to enter party politics – a move long projected and openly anticipated. He remained quiet about his intentions for a considerable time, letting the speculation and the symbolism do the work. 

Turnout approached 50% – indeed higher than in recent rounds, yet below most expectations but Radev activated a major part of previous non-voters. He also drew roughly a fifth to a sixth of votes previously cast for centre-right GERB and pro-European, anti-corruption coalition ‘We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria’ (PPDB), and around half of Vazrazhdane’s electorate – the radical right, pro-Russian party – leaving all major players significantly affected and a number of smaller parties below the 4% threshold. This nuanced realignment is a bit counterintuitive but signifies a strong demand for judicial reform combined with years of uncertainty and now mobilized behind a unifying, strong-man figure.

The election result sits uneasily alongside a consistent majority of 60% in support for EU membership. The explanation is both strategic and structural. Strategically, Radev ran a deliberately moderate campaign – Russia was mentioned alongside a need for negotiation in good faith, Euroscepticism was framed as pragmatism rather than opposition, and the anti-corruption message was kept broad enough to attract voters across the spectrum. Structurally, a new political actor with a strong leadership offer and a credible anti-corruption claim winning a majority is a tendency Bulgarian elections deliver periodically.  

Despite their name, Progressive Bulgaria’s economic platform is rather free-market and pro-business oriented, while not espousing any progressive-liberal values in particular. Instead, PB’s sweeping win consolidates a strong tendency for social conservatism in Bulgarian society, soft-to-hard Euroscepticism, moderate but solid pro-EU attitudes, as well as tacit support for Russia behind a pragmatic ‘pro-peace’ foreign policy doctrine. Their campaign was anchored in anti-system positions, the promise to ‘dismantle the oligarchic model’ and a firm commitment to sovereignty and the Bulgarian national interest when it comes to the war in Ukraine. When as President Radev gained limited but not negligible institutional leverage through successive caretaker governments, none of the promised anti-corruption agenda materialised – no public reports, no legislation preparation for the next government, no institutional consequences, no large scale clamping on vote fraud. Yet, a telling indicator is the BOTAŞ contract signed under his caretaker government in 2023 obliging the country to pay for 53,200 MWh of gas per day at a fixed price regardless of actual consumption, while utilising only around 11% of that capacity by mid-2025, with no termination clause and cheaper alternatives available.

Radev’s position on Ukraine has never been explicitly pro-Russian but it doesn’t need to be. A consistent language of neutrality, peace, and protecting Bulgaria’s economic interests with an opposition to arming Ukraine, framing those who support it as dragging Bulgaria into war. When Zelensky visited Sofia in 2023, Radev’s response was that Ukraine “insists on fighting this war” and that the bill is being paid by Europe. The NATO general profile makes this harder to read, providing institutional credibility that a straightforwardly pro-Russian politician would not have. He doesn’t single Russia out as the aggressor and his response to the question ‘Whose is Crimea’ is – ‘Russian’. 

Winning general trust with broad strokes is one thing; converting it into policy and reform is considerably harder. The outgoing minority government — a coalition of centre-right GERB, whose former finance minister carries a Magnitsky sanction, the socialist BSP, direct successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the anti-system ITN, backed by Magnitsky-sanctioned media mogul and ethnic Turkish minority party splinter leader Delyan Peevski – will be unable to block any major reforms that require a 2/3 majority. He will still need support for the 161 majority necessary for judicial reforms likely to come from PPDB, yet amidst potentially major foreign policy disagreements. 

So, if Radev’s promises are authentic, the chances for a new Judicial Council and a new State Prosecutor are high. 

But if his allegiances do lie with Moscow to the extent expected by some, then his incentive for genuine anticorruption reform are low-to-moderate. Corruption is Russia’s main channel of influence in the country and a Radev-led government would have little incentive to damage concrete practical vectors of Russian energy and political dependency, if the suspected allegiance is true.

Importantly, a strong stance against the EU or outright blocking of common EU policy would mean big economic and investment security risks so such behaviour is unlikely. Many parallels have been drawn with Viktor Orbán while Radev has explicitly flattered Orbán for years. Yet, Radev lacks the political experience, the confidence, the footing in the European Union institutions, the organisational base, and frankly the capability to replicate the Orban model of politics. For now. Instead of an abrupt anti-EU behaviour, his government policies would be focused on ‘pragmatic’ energy policy, opposition to EU support for Ukraine, friction and delays of EU decision-making. He will aim to position himself and Bulgaria as the magic link to Russia in negotiations to end the war.

Thus, it doesn’t take an Orbán to be damaging. It is enough to be obstructionist at key crossroads for European policy while masked as a pragmatist. Hopes that this path won’t prove to be an expensive experiment for Bulgarians and Europeans are high but doubts are very reasonable.